By A.J.Drenth
We are often told that it is human intelligence that distinguishes us from other forms of life. To support this notion, we may be asked to consider the various feats of science, engineering, or technology. Unfortunately, such a view fails to capture the whole story about humanity. Another human capacity, no less remarkable or profound, is our capacity for meaning and value. This is illustrated, for example, in extraordinary works of the arts and humanities. But because the humanities have not sent us to the moon or endowed us with flat-screened televisions, their accomplishments are more readily overlooked. In short, in our modern, technological age, we have come to privilege logic and utility (T) over value and beauty (F).
Consider another example. We are often informed by evolutionary theorists (most of whom are Thinking types) that evolution is entirely explainable in terms of mechanism. Biased toward Thinking, their explanations focus almost exclusively on mechanism, quantity, (e.g., numbers of offspring) and utility, while effectively ignoring the potential role of subjective factors (e.g., the experienced or anticipated value / quality of an adaptation). The only “value” (although I doubt they would label it as such) they may ascribe to evolution is its concern for the perpetuation of genes. This may explain, at least in part, why evolutionary theory, in its common rendering, fails to sit right with a lot people, since it ignores the animating and informative role of subjective processes.
To be fair, science has notoriously had a harder time evaluating quality (F) than quantity (ST). Qualitative experiences—tastes, preferences, feelings, sentiments, etc.—are more resistant to precise measurement or quantification. That does not, however, make these experiential phenomena any less real. Nonetheless, scientists generally focus their efforts on phenomena that are more amenable to controlled observation or measurement. They overstep their bounds, however, when they assert that everything can or will eventually be explained in mechanistic terms. In so doing, they argue from philosophical rather than scientific grounds.
If we consider the work of theorists such as Carl Jung, William James, Henri Bergson, Ken Wilber, and Alfred North Whitehead, we learn that there are alternatives to reductionism, views in which T, F, S, and N (Jung), subjective and objective (Whitehead), as well as intellect and intuition (Bergson) are granted more or less equivalent ontological and epistemological footing. As a group, we might classify such theorists as non-reductionists or holists. They avoid trying to explain away or reduce N and F phenomena to S and T phenomenon. Instead of trying to reduce mind (N) to matter (ST) or vice-versa, they grant them equal primacy in the fabric of reality.
While for some these issues may seem overly abstract and complicated, they do impact the way we see and experience the world. Those who view the world in strictly mechanistic terms are apt to experience life differently those who see the universe as characteristically conscious or alive. If we were to grant equal credence to T and F, we might place the arts and humanities on equal footing with science and technology. Similarly, if we acknowledge the value and utility of both N and S, we might invest not only in practical affairs (S), but also in theoretical projects (N).
Even if S, N, T, and F are equally valuable and viable approaches, we cannot ignore the fact that we all have preferences for one of them over and above the other three. We all have at least one function (i.e., our dominant function) that we learn to use effectively, making us all “specialists” in some regard. I do not in any way consider this a bad thing. Indeed, our favored functions and personal interests aid us in our quest for truth, value, morality, pleasure, or utility. What may be worth considering, however, is whether you have become too narrow in focus, if you have favored your dominant function or personal preferences to the point of imbalance or dysfunction. In other words, have you become focused or biased to the degree that you are shutting out other vital currents of life?
In sum, I am arguing against reductionism in favor of methodological pluralism. I am not, however, advocating a laissez-faire, “anything goes” approach to life, but one in which we recognize and embrace our own strengths, interests, and specialties. In other words, I am suggesting we remain open to and accepting of diverse methodologies, while at once recognizing and developing our individual and typological strengths. Among other things, such an approach can help alleviate unnecessary guilt regarding what we should be doing. This is especially pertinent to those experiencing guilt related to authentic functioning according to our personality type. For instance, an INFJ doing what an INFJ does best, ought not be faulted for being impractical. Yes, practical concerns (ST) are, in the grand scheme of things, equally important as N and F matters, but since it is not the natural role of INFJs to focus on logistics and practicalities, they should not be expected to devote significant resources to or show high levels of competence in ST affairs.
Related Posts:
The Problem of Truth & Meaning in Modern Life
Meaning, Identity, & Purpose in Life: Part I
Type, Science, Religion, & the Meaningful Life
Readers may also wish to explore my recommending reading page, which includes brief summaries of some of my favorite works.